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Abstract
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) is intended to stimulate the employment of
individuals who are members of certain groups of the labor force by providing a wage subsidy
(in the form of a tax credit) to employers of recently-hired eligible workers.  This intervention
into the labor market has direct and indirect earnings and employment consequences for both
eligible and ineligible individuals. The paper evaluates the impacts of TJTC by using a treatment
and comparison group methodology. Corrections for nonrandom selection are undertaken.  The
primary sources of data are state quarterly wage record data from the Unemployment Insurance
system and the Employment Service Automated Reporting System (ESARS).  
The results indicate that the availability and usage of TJTC enhances outcomes for
nonwhite male youth (both eligible and ineligible), but is stigmatizing for eligible individuals from
other race/sex groups, who appear to be slightly worse off because of the program than their
ineligible counterparts. Obtaining a voucher increases employment and wages, but it appears as
if selection effects are responsible. Importantly, the improved outcomes are not accompanied by
displacement effects.  Finally, being certified results in increased wages, but higher turnover and
lower total employment.THE EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS IMPACTS OF
THE TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT
Government intervention into the labor market for the purpose of assisting disadvantaged
individuals usually occurs on the supply side.  The training programs funded by the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) and those of its predecessor, the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (CETA) Title I, are and were intended to enhance the human capital and
productivity of participants.  
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) program is a demand-side intervention in the private
labor market.  Employers are given a tax credit for a portion of the wages they pay to recently-
hired workers in certain eligibil-ity categories.  As originally authorized by the Revenue Act of
1978, TJTC provided employers a credit of 50 percent of wages paid in the first twelve months
of employment, up to a maximum of $6000, and 25 percent of wages (subject to the same
maximum) paid in the next 12 months.  Thus, the maximum credit for a worker was $4,500.  The
target groups were:  Economically disadvantaged youth aged 18-24, youth aged 18-24 in a
cooperative education program, economically disadvantaged Vietnam veterans under 35,
economically disadvantaged ex-offenders, handicapped persons receiving or having completed
vocational rehabilitation, general assistance recipients, and SSI recipients.  The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 eliminated eligibility for cooperative education students and added two
new target groups--AFDC recipients and involuntarily terminated CETA/PSE employees.  The
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 added a new target group--economically
disadvantaged students 16-17--for whom employers could receive an 85 percent credit on up to
$3000 paid in Summer wages.  The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 eliminated the CETA/PSE
terminee target group and extended the program to December 31, 1985.
The program terminated on that date, but was reauthorized through 1988 under the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.  This Act limited the credit to 40 percent of first year wages up to $6000,
eliminated the second year allowance, and required a minimum of 90 days or 120 hours of
employment to claim a credit.  The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 extended
the credit through 1989, but reduced the age limit for disadvantaged youth from 24 to 22 and cut
the credit for Summer youth employees from 85 to 40 percent.  The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989 extended the program through September, 1990 and required
employers to certify that a "good faith effort" was made to determine individuals' eligibility prior
to hiring.1,2
Two basic forms are used:  a voucher and a certification.  A voucher is issued by the
Employment Service or other vouchering agency to an eligible job seeker.  The individual
presents the voucher form to the employer, who, after deciding to hire the applicant, completes
the employer declaration and returns the form to the Employment Service.  If an employer plans
to hire an individual who is thought to be eligible but does not have a voucher, the employer may
request a certification in writing from the Employment Service. The certification is completed by
the Employment Service after receipt of the employer declaration or certification request and is
sent to the employer as back-up documentation for tax purposes.The government does not know who might hire a disadvantaged job seeker if a subsidy
is offered, so the TJTC is operated as an entitlement, i.e., any employer may receive the
(refundable) credit.  For a reasonably generous subsidy, the number of firms that have received
the credit and the percentage of eligible individuals that have been vouchered are small.  Through
1985, 6 million vouchers had been issued and 2.6 million certifications had been granted.  Bishop
and Kang (1988) analyze employer participation and Christensen (1984) analyzes target group
member participation.  The Wall Street Journal (November 7, 1989) reports that participation by
firms may be as low as 1 percent.
Other examinations of the TJTC include Lorenz (1985, 1988), Burtless (1985), Arwady
(1988), and Levitan and Gallo (1987).  Lorenz (1985, 1988) finds, using a relatively long-run
data set, that TJTC benefits are concentrated on a relatively small set of job finders with higher
wages.  The studies are weakened, however, by the choice of the treatment and comparison
groups--vouchered individuals where certifications were issued versus vouchered, but noncertified
individuals.  Burtless (1985) examines data from a rigorous, classical experiment with random
assignment to a control and two treatment groups who were given wage subsidy vouchers.  Both
treatment groups fared worse in the labor market, which was attributed to vouchering.  However,
this study lacks geographic generalizability (it was performed in a single urban location); it is
based on small sample sizes; and it has only limited data on the experiment's participants.   The 3
Arwady (1988) study is a case study of widespread usage of the TJTC in a single corporation,
whereas the gist of the Levitan and Gallo (1987) paper is that no conclusive evidence exists
concerning TJTC's impacts, so it is premature to alter the policy based on its merit.
The present study reports on findings and analyses of one part of a large, nationwide
evaluation of the TJTC program.  That evaluation included a process analysis, a cost-benefit
analysis, and impact analyses for four target groups using data from twelve representative states.
In this paper, we focus on the effects TJTC had on the earnings and employment of the
disadvantaged youth target group only.  
In a classical experimental sense, three "treatments" comprise the TJTC program--
eligibility, vouchering, and certification. Correspondingly, this study evaluates the employment
and earnings impacts of all three.  For each of the analyses, "pre- and post-treatment" outcome
data for a treatment and a comparison sample of individuals are analyzed.  Outcomes examined
are quarters of employment and average quarterly wages (unconditional and conditioned on
employment).  Employment and earnings data come from states' Unemployment Insurance
quarterly wage record systems.  Those data were merged to data from the Employment Service
Automated Record System (ESARS), which contained important individual background
information.
Evaluating Treatment Effects with Nonexperimental Data
The problem of properly isolating and estimating treatment effects in nonexperimental data
is the subject of continuing controversy and research.  Although most of the literature on this 4
subject has centered around training interventions rather than demand-side subsidies, the empirical
considera- tions of the two problems are very similar.  A standard linear specification for an outcome, say earnings for example, might be as
follows:
(1) Y  = b'X  + cT  + e + e + e it it t i i t it
where Y  is earnings (or log earnings) for individual i in period t, X  is a vector of characteristics it it
usually including education and age or experi- ence, b is the corresponding vector of coefficients,
T is a binary variable for having received the treatment, c is the effect of the treatment in period i t
t, e is an unobserved individual effect constant over time, e is an unobserved time-period effect i t
constant over individuals, and e  is an unobserved random effect, possibly autocorrelated. it
Nonrandom selection occurs when the unobserved individual effects e or e  are correlated with i it
the treatment variable.  
Ashenfelter (1978) used an autoregressive earnings function to analyze Manpower
Development and Training Act (MDTA) classroom training effects. Cain (1975) and Goldberger
(1972) pointed out that if pre-program earnings are the sole selection criteria, then an
autoregressive earnings function can consistently measure program effects.  Bassi (1983) noted,
however, if the error term is autocorrelated, as it is likely to be in an earnings equation, this
method will produce biased and inconsistent results.  Other shortcomings of this approach have
been discussed (e.g., Cooley, McGuire, and Prescott 1981, Director 1979, Nickell 1979, and
Bloom 1984).
Kiefer (1979), in another analysis of MDTA impacts, utilized a fixed-effect model that
eliminated the individual fixed effect e, thereby elimi- nating concern about correlation between i
e and T.  However, e  may be a selection factor itself; for instance, only those with temporarily i i it
low earn-ings may be selected.  Kiefer addressed this problem by obtaining an instru-mental
variables estimate of T for use in the wage deviation equation. i
Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger (1981) provided a nonlinear technique to control directly
for sample selection bias based on earlier work by Heckman (1976) and Lee (1978).  The
approach is to model selection directly in a stochastic decision model.  One receives the treatment
(T  = 1) if i
(2) d'Z  + u  > 0, is is
where Z  is a vector of observable characteristics in period s, the period prior to treatment, d is is
a vector of coefficients, and u  is a random error term.  Sample selection, in which u  is is is
correlated with e  can be handled (under the assumption of joint normality of u  and e ) by it is it
estimating the coefficients in (2) using standard probit analysis, calculating the expected value of
u  given the known information (via the inverse Mills' ratio), and including it in the wage is
equation (3):
(3) Y  = b'X  + cT  + r  k + v   it it t i ue i itHere, k = E(u *Z , T ) and r  = cov(u , e ).  Under the assumptions stated, this extra term i is is i ue is it
purges the correlation of T and e .  The implica- tions of autocorrelation of the e  for first- i it it
differencing have been considered by Willke (1985).  
Finally, Ashenfelter and Card (1985) estimated the effects of CETA training using only
means and other moments of trainee and control earnings for a nine-year period.  They use a
components-of-variance model employing permanent and transitory error components, as well
as an individual earnings growth parameter with nonrandom selection into training.
Estimating TJTC Treatment Effects
With TJTC, eligibility and certification "treatments" are not subject to nonrandom
selection.  Eligibility is an entitlement to all members of the target populations.  It is subject to
neither self-selection nor agency  selection.  Certification is exempt from nonrandom selection,
on the other hand, by appropriate choice of comparison groups.  Therefore, in the models
presented below, only the vouchering treatment effects correct for selection.  The Barnow, Cain,
and Goldberger approach is most appropriate for this problem, given the relatively short time
series on income and the extensive background data available.
Eligibility.  The notion of an eligibility impact is somewhat difficult conceptually since
eligibility is not an intervention applied to or chosen by the affected population.  Rather, the
impact emanates from employers altering their hiring behavior and/or individuals altering their
labor force behavior as a result of the TJTC program.  The most direct result should be increased
employment (certification) of recognized TJTC eligibles (those vouchered) due to the tax credit
incentive.  
The TJTC intended impact on eligibles would thus be expected to be an increasing function
of vouchering and certification rates in the area, and to be zero if there is no TJTC program or
activity at all.  However, TJTC may have indirect effects.  Being vouchered may be stigmatizing
(see Burtless 1985), in that it identifies the individual as being disadvantaged and possibly on
welfare.  Such stigma should be diluted by increased familiarity through widespread vouchering,
i.e. by higher rates of vouchering and certification.  
The TJTC effects on ineligibles may be positive or negative.  TJTC is intended to create
new jobs, but it may be that tax-advantaged workers displace those whose wages are not
subsidized.  Higher vouchering and certification rates would then cause greater reductions in the
employment and earnings of ineligibles.  On the other hand, these wage subsidies may stimulate
business to the extent the employment of all workers is increased.
Construction of the empirical model for estimating TJTC effects on eligible and ineligible
populations therefore must include the effects of vouchering and certification activity in the
appropriate market area, with separate effects for eligibles and ineligibles, and an allowance for
an eligibility "shift" effect even at zero levels of TJTC activity, to provide for stigma or other
indirect effects.   To identify these effects, the estimation sample must include eligibles, 5ineligibles who are 18-24 but not disadvantaged, and ineligibles who are disadvantaged but outside
the age range, that is over the age of 24.
The outcome equation, in general terms, is then
(4) Y  = a  + a A  + a A  + a D  + a D *A  + a D *A  + a E  + a PV  + a E *PV ijt 0 1 it 2 it 3 i 4 i it 5 i it 6 i 7 j 8 i j
2 2
+ a PC  + a E *PC + c'Z  + e + e + e 9 j 10 i j ijt i t it
The outcome variable, Y , is indexed by individual i in region j for time period t.  Age, denoted ijt
by A , enters the model quadratically as in the standard Mincerian age-earnings profile. i
Disadvantaged status, D, and its interaction with age create a separate disadvantaged age-earnings i
profile, and the eligibility treatment dummy, E, allows the latter profile to be shifted during ages i
18-24.   PV, the local vouchering penetration rate (pro-portion of eligibles vouchered), captures 6
the average vouchering effect on ineligibles, while that variable together with its interaction with
the treatment dummy show the total vouchering effect on eligibles.  The effect of certification is
modeled similarly using the certification penetration rate PC.  Other control variables, including
education, an urban-rural indicator, and local employment conditions are in Z.
Equation (4) contains unobservable fixed individual and time period effects, e and e, i t
respectively.  Correlation between these two effects would result in biased coefficient estimates
for this equation.  For estimation purposes, (4) was translated to an earnings change equation
under the assumption that the TJTC program effect was entirely produced during the encounter
or treatment year.  The treatment is considered to take place at the time the individual contacts
the Employment Service.
Vouchering.  The principal treatment effect for vouchering is expected to be manifested
in an outcome equation of the form:
(5) Y  = b  + b V  + b PV  + b V *PV + b PC  + b V *PC + d'Z  + e + e + e ijt 0 1 ij 2 j 3 ij j 4 j 5 ij j ijt i t it
where V  is the "treatment" dummy representing whether the individual was vouchered.  The ij
coefficient on the voucher-voucher penetration rate inter- action, b , measures whether there are 3
increasing or decreasing returns to agency vouchering activity.  The vector Z  contains other ijt
variables expected to affect earnings, much like those in the eligibility model.  As in that model,
outcome changes were examined so as to eliminate possible bias resulting from correlation of the
treatment variables and the individual fixed effect.  Thus (5) was estimated in first-differenced
form.
Selection bias is still possible, however, if the voucher treatment (often the choice of
Employment Service personnel) is correlated with the random error e  in the pre-program period. is
The Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger correction for sample selection was used to correct for
selection bias as a second empirical strategy.  In this case, 
(6) V  = f(PC , W, VARY , Z , v ) ij j i i ij ijwhere  W = welfare status of individual i i
VARY  =  a measure of variation in previous earnings i
       vij =  a random error term, having a joint bivariate normal distribution with eis
       Z  =  other individual characteristics, not necessarily the same as in equation (5). ij
Being on welfare may reveal a smaller "stigma" effect of vouchering, and variation in earnings
may reveal higher potential ability.  The function f(.) was estimated with a probit technique.  The
joint distribution of v  and e  is due to unobserved factors that affect both vouchering and ij is
outcomes.  The correlation between e  and v  can be corrected by estimating (7): is ij
7
(7) (Y  - Y ) = b V  + b PV  + b V *PV + b PC  + b V *PC + b k  + d'(Z  - Z ) ijt ijs 1 ij 2 j 3 ij j 4 j 5 ij j 6 ij ijt ijs
+ (e  - w ) it is
The results of estimating (5) in differenced form without the selection correction and (7)
with the selection correction are compared to test for the presence of selection.  In both models,
b , b , and b  will be positive if TJTC favorably affects vouchered individuals.  If displacement 1 3 5
is present because of vouchering, b  and b  will be negative.  If positive selection is present (i.e. 2 4
creaming), then b  in (7) will be positive. 6
Certification.  By limiting the comparison group for the certification study to other job
finders, attention is focused on performance on the job, and the sample selection problem is
mitigated.  The outcome equation is:
(8) (Y  - Y ) = c +c C +c PV +c C *PV+c PC +c C *PC+d'(Z -Z )+(e  - e ) ijt ijs 0 1 ij 2 j 3 ij j 4 j 5 ij j ijt ijs it is
Here c  represents the effect of certification, C , on the outcome after controlling for the variables 1 ij
present in Z , which will be those used in the other treatment effect studies.  Once again, ijt
examining outcome changes eliminates the fixed effect problem, and again positive TJTC
certification impacts imply c , c , and c  greater than zero and displacement will be suggested if 1 3 5
c  and c  are less than zero. 2 4
Data
Data from several sources were utilized for this analysis.  For the eligibility study, a
random sample of automated Employment Service records (also known as the ESARS data) for
individuals in twelve states was chosen.   Only those individuals encountering the ES for the first 8
time in 1982 were selected for this study, because complete data for ES services prior to 1982
were not available and thus could not be controlled.  This condition creates a group of TJTC-
eligibles and ineligibles whose first exposure to TJTC occurred in 1982, thus specifying 1982 as
the year of treatment.  For the individuals selected in this way, quarter-by-quarter earnings from
1980 to 1984 were obtained from Unemployment Insurance wage records.  The absence of
earnings for a quarter was assumed to indicate no employment in that quarter.  Penetration rate
and other location-specific variables were constructed by county.  The voucher and certificationsamples originated with individuals randomly selected from 1982 TJTC voucher and certification
records at twenty-eight local ES offices among the twelve states.  
Changes in average quarterly wages, average quarters employed per year, and average
wages in employed quarters were the primary outcome variables examined.  In each case, the
"prior" period was the eight quarters of 1980 and 1981.  The decision to use this period reflects
a compromise between choosing the earlier year as probably freer of selection bias and choosing
the latter year because of greater full-time labor force participation and hence greater
comparability to later years.  The "post" period used was the eight quarters of 1983 and 1984,
which should represent a combination of short-run and long-run effects.  The treatment year,
1982, was excluded because of the unemployment likely to be present, but this choice may
underemphasize short-run effects.  Table 1 gives means and standard deviations for year-by-year
earnings, employment outcomes, and other background variables.
In the eligibility study data, ineligibles have mean earnings and employment levels
consistently above those of eligibles.  This difference is due in large measure to the 2.8 year mean
age difference resulting from the age limit on eligibles and the inclusion of older ineligibles (aged
25-29) as comparison group members.  Both groups have similar temporal patterns of outcome
changes, however.  Treatment and comparison group mean levels are much more similar for the
voucher and certification studies, where there are no significant age differences.  The patterns of
earnings and employment growth here show a larger increase for treatment groups than for
comparison groups in 1983, the first year following treatment.  The 1984 levels become more
equal, and average earnings per quarter employed stay fairly equal throughout, suggesting a
temporary TJTC effect on employment.
Empirical Results and Discussion
The eligibility, vouchering, and certification impact models were estimated for four target
groups in earlier work and complete results are reported in Hollenbeck, Willke, and Ershadi
(1986).  Here, the impact results for the disadvantaged youth target group only are presented.
The models were estimated separately for four race/sex populations.
Eligibility impacts.  Table 2 presents selected results of the eligibility impact analysis.  It
shows individual coefficient estimates for the variables that measure TJTC activity for each
outcome and race/sex group.  Also shown are the net effects of all TJTC variables combined,
evaluated at penetration rate means, for eligibles and ineligibles.  The figures shown are estimated
effects on the change in the average quarterly outcome (total wages, quarters employed) between
1980-81 and 1983-84.  That is, while average quarterly wages increased for both eligibles and
ineligibles over this period, the net effect for eligibles shows whether average wages of eligibles
in areas of average TJTC activity increased more or less than those of ineligibles in areas with
no TJTC activity.
For eligible black/Hispanic males, the existence of the TJTC entitle- ment has a positive
effect on wages, and essentially no impact on total employment.  For all other race/sex groups,the results presented in table 2 are consistent with the hypothesis of TJTC having a stigmatizing
influence.  All of the net effects for eligibles are negative for these groups.  This suggests,
assuming that the model has adequate controls, that eligible white males and white and
black/Hispanic females experience lower wages and lower rates of employment because of the
existence of the credit.  Eligible females, in particular, have large (negative) employment impacts.
Buttressing the stigma hypothesis is the fact that the net effects on ineligibles suggest that
increased rates of vouchering and certification lead to increases in employment.  However, the
increased employment is at lower levels of wage income (except for nonwhite males.)
The model that was estimated allows us to disentangle the influence of the program factors
in explaining outcomes.  The first column of estimates shows the direct influence of the
"treatment," i.e., being eligible.   The next two columns capture the net impact of voucher 9
penetration.  Because certification is controlled separately, voucher penetration will not capture  
any job creation.  Rather, it is intended to control for possible effects of differences in vouchering
practice by the employment agency, i.e., from very selective vouchering to widespread
"broadcast" vouchering.  To estimate the order of magnitude of these effects, recall that table 1
shows that the mean penetration rate is about 15 percent.  The impact of certification penetra- tion
can be calculated from the estimates in the 4th and 5th column (the mean penetration rate was
around 1.7 percent).
For most outcomes, the net effect on eligibility approximates the direct effect of the
"treatment," suggesting that the levels of vouchering and certification had little influence.  The
exceptions to this are for the net impact on quarters employed, which is positive for all groups
but white females, for whom the net effect is approximately zero.  These results reflect the
intended outcome of the TJTC program, i.e., increased employment of the eligible group.  Using
the coefficients for white males, the net impact of a one percentage point increase in certification
is an increase of .022 quarters worked for the average eligible.  Put differently, a certification
rate of 45 percent (all else equal) would increase (the change in) the number of quarters employed
by 1 full quarter for each eligible.
TJTC effects on ineligibles (a  and a ) show interesting patterns.  Certification penetration 7 9
has a significantly positive effect on quarters employed in all race/sex groups.  TJTC job creation
was apparently associated with significant job expansion in general, either as cause or effect.
Thus, no net displacement is indicated here.  However, the negative wage effects of certification
on whites but positive wage effects for blacks suggest that job creation was probably in the low-
paying end of the wage spectrum, possibly at the expense of higher-paying jobs.  While the
effects of voucher penetration varied somewhat, the signs of the net "displacement" effects shown
in table 2 generally follow the signs of the certification effects.
Voucher impacts.  The voucher impacts for the youth target group are presented in table
3.  Again, the outcome measures are differences between 1983-84 quarterly averages and 1980-81
quarterly averages.  The impact models were estimated two ways for the same four race/sex
groups discussed above for the eligibility impacts.  The differenced model described above was
estimated using OLS and using the nonlinear selectivity correction suggested by Barnow, Cain,and Goldberger (1981) (see equation 7).  As a point of reference, the revenue loss to the Treasury
per voucher through 1986 was about $350.
The gross vouchering impacts for average wages during quarters employed (shown in
column 1) from the OLS estimation were generally not significant except for nonwhite males,
where they were negative.  The (OLS) employment impacts, on the other hand, were positive and
fairly large for males, and positive, although not significant, for females.  These two findings
suggest that vouchering has a positive influence on employment, but the jobs have similar or
perhaps lower wages than the jobs obtained by the comparison group (eligible, but nonvouchered
youth).
The OLS net impacts of vouchering after taking into account the penetration rate effects (the
sixth column in the table) show a considerable dampening of the gross impacts.  For example,
for nonwhite females, the average wages during quarters employed impact fell from $162 to $30
and the average quarters employed impact fell from .18 to .02.  Similar declines occurred for
virtually all the outcome variables for all the race/sex groups.  This suggests a strong declining
returns to scale effect for vouchering, i.e. the more vouchering performed by program
administrators, the smaller the impacts of the voucher on employment and earnings.  The net
effects on the comparison groups, which are referred to in the table as displacement effects,
suggest some employment displacement for all groups except white males, with the magnitude
of those effects particularly large for nonwhites (-.17 and -.20 quarters for females and males,
respectively).
Referring back to equation (7), the coefficient on the k  variable (sometimes referred to as ij
Heckman's lambda) measures the correlation of the outcome change with the likelihood of being
selected for vouchering after controlling for known characteristics.  A positive value might be
interpreted as evidence of "creaming."  The white male youth group shows larger voucher
coefficients than in the uncorrected regressions, and thus must be the only group to have negative
(lambda) coefficients.   To the extent that the assumptions of this estimation technique are met, 10
this result indicates that those selected for vouchering would, other things equal, have smaller
increases in earnings, but the vouchering itself has a large impact.  The results for black males
and both female groups are just the opposite, however.  The selectivity coefficients are
significantly positive, suggesting that the vouchered individuals were most likely to have greater
earnings and employment increases anyway, and the impact of vouchering was to dampen their
improvement.  Neither effect is implausible, but the size of the effect for white females is rather
large.  (This may be attributable to multicollinearity of the voucher variable and k .)  The reason ij
that white male youth may be different from the other groups is that they may be the least likely
to be discriminated against, so only the least employable were vouchered, while vouchers were
given to the most employable of the other groups.
Certification impacts.  The final set of impacts to be discussed--impacts of being certified--
are presented in table 4.  In addition to average quarterly wages and quarters of employment
between 1983-84 and 1980-81, the change in number of quarters worked per employer was used
as a measure of turnover/retention.  The comparison group in this analysis was economically
disadvantaged youth who were not certified but who found jobs.  Because both groups wereemployed, it was not necessary to estimate selectivity-corrected models.  The gross impacts of
being certified were insignificantly different from zero for both quarters employed and quarters
worked per employer.  All of the groups except nonwhite males, however, had large positive
wage impacts that were estimated to be on the order of $550 to $700 per quarter.  The average
tax credit per certification was about $830.  The net impacts were again smaller than the gross
impacts which suggests decreasing returns to vouchering; however, the wage effect was still
positive and relatively large.  The retention impacts tended to have negative signs, but were not
significant.
The displacement estimates for the certification impact analysis suggest that there is some
substitution of TJTC certified workers for disadvantaged, noncertified workers.  When the
vouchering and certification penetration rates increase, the earnings and employment outcomes
for the comparison group decline.  This displacement is particularly large for males.  For
females, the displacement estimates are still mostly negative, but are unlikely to be statistically
significant.
Summary.  Table 5 summarizes the major results for the eligibility, vouchering, and
certification studies.  The results of the eligibility study generally confirm the hypothesis of
stigma, particularly for females.  The existence of TJTC (the eligibility "treatment") seemed to
have negative employment and wage consequences for all race/sex groups in the eligible
population, except for nonwhite males.  The latter group experienced positive outcomes.  The
comparison group for the eligibility study, nondisadvantaged youth and disadvantaged individuals
aged 25-29, were not displaced by TJTC and in fact, experienced slightly better employment
outcomes when vouchering and certification rates were higher.  However, net impacts on wages
were zero or negative.  The impact on ineligibles should be weighted heavily by the fact that this
group is the largest share of the general population of any of the treatment or comparison groups.
Besides the positive impacts on nonwhite males, the only other benefit of TJTC indicated by the
eligibility study was that the certification penetration rate was directly related to increased
employment, albeit not nearly enough to overcome the large negative "gross" impacts.  
Given the existence of TJTC (and its possible stigmatizing effects), the next question
addressed was the effects of actually obtaining a voucher.  These impacts were mixed.  The
vouchering impacts tended to be positive for quarters of employment and zero or negative for
wages while employed.  The selectivity correction technique suggested that selection was evident
at the vouchering stage, with "creaming" occurring for white females and nonwhite males and
females.  The selection effect seemed to be just the opposite for white males, however, where it
appeared the least employable were selected for treatment.  The positive employment impacts do
not seem to generally cause displacement of whites, but do indicate displacement of nonwhite,
disadvantaged youth.  
Finally, for youth that were (vouchered and) certified, large positive earnings impacts were
estimated.  However, the youth in the treatment group had higher turnover and fewer quarters
of employment.  Increases in the vouchering and certification rates tended to cause some
displacement of noncertified employees by certified workers, but at the low-wage end of the scale.Using nonexperimental data with its advantages (large sample sizes, low cost, and accurate
portrayal of actual program operations) and disadvantages (potential selection bias), this study's
findings echo the lackluster outcomes of TJTC found in most previous analyses.  At best, TJTC
is only slightly alleviating the labor market problems of disadvantaged youth.  At worst, it is
stigmatizing such youth and causing displacement of them by nondisadvantaged individuals.
(Previous experimental evidence seems to confirm the stigmatizing nature of a wage subsidy
where individuals announce their eligibility to potential employers.)  Vouchering does create
employment for youth, but statistical evidence suggests that (agency) selection may have been at
work.  Individuals who were certified had increased wage income, but potentially shorter job
tenures.  This supports the duration limitations that have been added to TJTC.  Perhaps economic
incentives such as returning to a 2-year credit, where the credit increases with tenure would be
even more effective.
In short, demand-side interventions for the purpose of assisting disadvantaged individuals
are unlikely to be efficacious if they are structured as the TJTC was in the early 1980's.References
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Some observers suggest that the frequent changes to the program and the short-term 1
authorizations have been major barriers to employer participation.
In the early implementation of the program, employers had been allowed retroactive 2
vouchers and certifications.  That is, after the hire had been made, employers could request
vouchers and certifications.  This practice obviously confounded the intentions of the subsidy and
was restricted by regulation.  Our data do not completely identify retroactive vouchers, although
we did delete cases from the analyses if date of voucher was strictly later than date of hire.
The Burtless study analyzed data from an experiment in which welfare recipients were 3
trained to tell potential employers of their eligibility for the TJTC.  Gary Burtless has brought
to our attention a study (Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services and The Institute
for Research on Poverty, 1982) that describes the results of another random assignment
experiment in which target group members (welfare, ex-offenders, and handicapped) were trained
to announce their eligibility for TJTC to employers.  Again, the treatment groups fared worse
than controls.  The confirmatory results of two random assignment experiments is very strong
evidence that having welfare recipients announce their eligibility for a tax credit is stigmatizing.
Note, however, that the present study concerns the youth target group, which has not been the
subject of experimentation.
An interesting aspect of the Wisconsin project is that an experiment was conducted with
employers that showed that promotion of TJTC to employers was effective in increasing
certifications.
For a detailed discussion, see Heckman and Robb (1985). 4
Eligibility, however, for the youth target group studied here, is a function of being aged 5
18-24 and being disadvantaged.  Both of these characteristics are likely to affect earnings
independently of the existence of TJTC.  Earnings are generally thought to increase at a
decreasing rate with age, creating the familiar concave age-earnings profile.  Disadvantaged
individuals, at any age, are likely to have a distinct age-earnings profile, probably lower and
flatter than the nondisadvantaged one.  Eligibles belong to this latter group, but only if aged 18-
24.  TJTC eligibility effects will then shift the age 18-24 portion of the disadvantaged age-
earnings profile either upwards or downward.
Ed Lorenz has indicated to us that the ESARS economically disadvantaged flag may be 6
somewhat unreliable, although he feels that this data item did not become particularly suspect
until after the termination of the CETA/PSE group in 1984.The treatment is considered to take place at the time the individual contacts the 7
Employment Service.  Hence, the TJTC treatment variables are expected to affect outcomes only
in the period following treatment and are not subtracted out in this equation.  Selectivity
correction is as follows:
k  = g(d'X )/G(d'X ) if V  = 1 ij ij ij ij
    = -g(d'X )/(1-G(d'X )) if V  = 0 ij ij ij
Here g(.) is the normal probability density function and G(.) is the normal cumulative density
function.
e  = E[e  * VOUCH , X ] + w is is ij ij is
              = b k  + w 6 ij is
where, by definition,
b  = Cov(v , e )/Var(v ) 6 ij is ij
and is a coefficient to be estimated, and w  is distributed normally with 0 mean. is
These states were California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 8
Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Tennessee.  California and Florida were
not used in the eligibility study because their data did not include disadvantaged status, which was
necessary to identify eligibles from ineligibles.
Recall that the treatment is being aged 18-24, being economically disadvantaged, and 9
encountering the Employment Service.  The comparison group are also individuals who
encountered the Employment Service and either are aged 18-24 and not economically
disadvantaged or are aged 25-29 and disadvantaged.  Assigning the impact to the existence of
TJTC is a strong assumption.  In fact, the coefficient estimates the impact of the interaction
between being aged 18-24 and being disadvantaged economically.
This is confirmed in the full regression output, which is available from the authors on 10
request.Table 1
YOUTH SAMPLE MEANSa
(Standard deviations in parentheses)
Variable Year
Eligibility Study Voucher Study Certification Study
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(1,158)
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(1,001)
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(1,048)




































































































Dollar figures are in 1982 dollars. aTable 2
YOUTH ELIGIBILITY IMPACTSa,b














Sample Size R2 Eligibility Displacement
White Males a6 a7 a8 a9 a10
Change in average
























-.013 .051 106,387 .029
Change in quarterly











-158 -66 47,353 .085
Black/Hispanic Males
Change in average
























-.006 .100 43,167 .045
Change in quarterly











159 68 15,009 .070
White Females
Change in average
























-.119 .049 84,386 .039
Change in quarterly











-78 -47 34,762 .071
Black/Hispanic Females
Change in average
























-.186 .052 41,930 .049
Change in quarterly











-100 -20 12,997 .058
 Dollar figures are in 1982 dollars *Significant at .10 level; **Significant at .05 level; ***Significant at .01 level. a
 All impacts are changes for (83, 84) vs. (80, 81). bTable 3
YOUTH VOUCHER IMPACTSa,b















Size R2 Voucher Displacement
White Males a6 a7 a8 a9 a10
Change in average quarterly











69 34 7422 .013
Change in average quarterly 











625 43 7422 .013
Change in average quarters











.295 .046 7422 .028
Change in average quarters











1.36 .062 7422 .028
Change in average wages during











-227 -49 3132 .034
Change in average wages during











415 -59 3132 .034
Black Males
Change in average quarterly 











44 -75 4619 .024
Change in average quarterly











-493 -41 4619 .026
Change in average quarters











.142 -.199 4619 .048
Change in average quarters











-.211 -.144 4619 .046
Change in average wages during











-269 -135 1926 .033
Change in average wages during



























Size R2 Voucher Displacement
White Females
Change in average quarterly











132 23 5938 .026
Change in average quarterly











-2040 2 5938 .041
Change in average quarters











.134 -.038 5938 .040
Change in average quarters











-3.16 .076 5938 .040
Change in average wages during











-122 33 2447 .035
Change in average wages during











-1852 22 2447 .037
Black/Hispanic Females
Change in average quarterly 











37 -9 4453 .029
Change in average quarterly











-671 13 4453 .033
Change in average quarters











.022 -.169 4453 .041
Change in average quarters











-1.25 -.123 4453 .043
Change in average wages during











30 35 1724 .023
Change in average wages during











-652 28 1724 .026
 Dollar figure are in 1982 $. OLS means impacts were estimated using ordinary least squares from equation (5) in differenced form. BCG means the nonlinear a
selectivity correction suggested by Barnow, Caid, and Goldberger (1981) was used as given by equation (7).
 All impacts are changes for (83, 84) versus (80, 81). b
* Significant at .10 level; ** Signficant at .05 level; *** Significant at .01 level.Table 4
YOUTH CERTIFICATION IMPACTSa,b















Size R2 Certification Displacement
White Males












79 -102 4918 .015












-.15 -.33 4918 .026
Change in average wages











198 -48 2415 .039
Change in number of quarters











-.80 -.21 1731 .061
Nonwhite Males












-59 -78 2889 .015












-.20 -.29 2889 .044
Change in average wages











-16 -18 1459 .028
Change in number of quarters











-.56 -.15 1139 .042
White Females












140 -43 3806 .029












-.41 -.38 3806 .046
Change in average wages











383 52 1866 .042
Change in number of quarters











-.85 -.03 1318 .056
Nonwhite Females












192 -6 2654 .028












-.36 -.19 2654 .032
Change in averages wages











456 -3 1242 .037
Change in number of quarters 











-.40 -.29 817 .070
 Dollar figures are in 1982$. * Significant at .10 level; ** Significant at .05 level; *** Significant at .01 level. a
 All impacts are changes for (83, 84) versus (80, 81). bTable 5
SUMMARY OF RESULTS, BY STUDY
Study/Description of Treatment and Comparison Group Major Results
Eligibility Study
Treatment: Aged 18-24, Economically disadvantaged
encountered E.S.
 -  Eligibility has positive net impacts on nonwhite males in treatment
group. Negative net impacts for all other treatment race/sex groups.
Comparison: Aged 18-24 and not disadvantaged or aged 25-29 and
economically disadvantaged; encountered ES
- Increase in vouchering and certification result in positive outcomees
for non white males in comparison group.  Zero/mildly positive
impacts for all other comparison race/sex groups.
Certification penetration rate positively related to employment of
treatment group.
Voucher Study
Treatment: Eligible, vouchered, and encountered ES - OLS estimated net outcomes are generally positive for all raace/sex
treatment groups. OLS estimated relationship between vouchering
and certification and outcomes are small or negative for all race/sex
comparison groups.
Comparison: Eligible, not vouchered, encountered ES - Selectivity-corrected estimates of outcomes are positive for white
males and negative for all other race/sex groups in treatment group.
Certification and vouchering penetration rates are negatively related
to outcomes for treatment group suggesting, “decreasing returns.”
Certification Study
Treatment: Eligible, vouchered, and certified, encountered ES - Positive effect on wages while employed for treatment groups. 
Higher turnover and fewer quarters of employment for treatment
groups.
Comparison: Eligible, employed, encountered ES - Mildly negative outcomes of increased vouchering and certification
for comparison group members.